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I. INTRODUCTION
PERHAPS NO other issue in American politics has been as
controversial as federal preemption of state law. The Found-
ing Fathers did not think it was a problem; on the contrary, they
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thought it was a solution.1 As most constitutional law classes
teach, preemption of state law provided the solution the Fram-
ers were searching for to replace the weak Articles of Confedera-
tion, especially in the area of a conflict between federal and
state law. Through the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,3
the Founding Fathers provided for the supremacy of federal law
over state law and created the necessary constitutional authority
for federal preemption.4
A supreme federal power was essential to a coherent national
government. 5 It was also essential that the Framers maintain
state autonomy.6 By allowing Congress to choose whether to
preempt state law with federal legislation, the Framers gave Con-
gress "the authority to balance . . . the competing interests of
federal power and states' rights."7 Though the Framers pro-
vided for constitutional guidance with respect to preemption of
state laws, preemption remains as controversial today as it was
when the doctrine was created.
In general, the Supremacy Clause is designated as the author-
ity for Congress to preempt state law.8 The Supremacy Clause
provides that [t] his Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Trea-
ties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land. ... " The
clause was a result of a compromise between the Framers and
the competing values of both a national government and local
state governments.' 0 Its language has been interpreted to mean
that state laws that "interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of
Congress... must yield to it [federal laws and treaties]."11 Simi-
I Philip H. Corboy & Todd A. Smith, Federal Preemption of Product Liability Law:
Federalism and the Theory of Implied Preemption, 15 AM. J. TRIAL ADVoc. 435, 439
(1992).
2 Id. at 439-40.
3 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
4 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210-11 (1824).
5 Susan B. Foote, Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory Federal-
ism, 70 VA. L. REv. 1429, 1432 (1984).
6 Id. at 1433.
7 Id.
8 Sanjoy K. Bose et al., The Role of Federal Preemption in Administrative Law, 45
ADMIN. L. REv. 107, 111 (Paula A. Sinozich ed., 1993).
9 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
10 Bose et al., supra note 8, at 111.
H1 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 211.
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larly, McCulloch v. Maryland'2 held that state law is without effect
when state and federal law conflict.1 3
Despite over 200 years of case law, exactly when federal law
preempts state law is still a controversial question. The Supreme
Court has consistently maintained that" '[t] he purpose of Con-
gress is the ultimate touchstone' in determining if a state action
is pre-empted by federal law."14 The Court has explicitly listed
three circumstances that support congressional intent to pre-
empt state law.' 5 First, Congress can explicitly provide for pre-
emption of state law in the language of the statute.' 6 Second,
state law may be preempted when "it regulates conduct in a field
that Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy ex-
clusively." 17 This congressional intent may be inferred; but when
the field Congress has preempted includes an area traditionally
occupied by the states, congressional intent to supersede state
laws must be "clear and manifest." 8 Finally, "state law is pre-
empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law,"
such as when it is impossible for a party to comply with both
federal and state law, or where state law "stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."19
To supplement these categories, the Supreme Court has
shown that express statements of congressional intent are pre-
ferred because express preemption makes the "courts' task...
"20an easy one. 0 While preemption remains a useful congres-
sional tool, however, the Supreme Court has resisted expansion
12 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Is Id. at 427.
14 Corboy & Smith, supra note 1, at 444 (citing Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClen-
don, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990), quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S.
202, 208 (1985); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987), quoting
Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963);
California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 284 (1987), quoting
Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. at 103; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471
U.S. 724, 747 (1985), quoting Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. at 103); see also Donald T.
Bliss, Supreme Court Preemption Analysis: Differentiating the Hamiltonians and Jeffer-
sonians, 40 FED. B. NEWS &J. 84 (1993).
is Corboy & Smith, supra note 1, at 444-45.
16 Id. at 444 (citing English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990)).
17 Id. (citing English, 496 U.S. at 72, quoting Rice V. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
18 Id. (citing English, 496 U.S. at 72, quotingJones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S.
519, 525 (1977)).
19 Id. (citing English, 496 U.S. at 72, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941)).
20 Id. (citing English, 496 U.S. at 79).
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of the categories of preemption. 1 In response, state regulations
governing various activities have increased. Included among
these state regulations are state consumer protection statutes.
In general, this Comment discusses federal preemption of
state consumer protection laws in the area of airfare advertising.
The evolution of this subject can generally be traced back to the
"airfare wars" that began after the deregulation of the airline
industry. With the airline industry wide open, many airlines be-
gan to advertise bargain fares in a number of national newspa-
pers. In addition, frequent flyer programs came into existence,
usually advertised as heavily as the discount fares.
In conjunction with the "consumer movement,"2 2 states began
to monitor these airline advertisements closely after numerous
complaints from consumers. For example, though it gives the
"price" of the discount ticket, an airfare advertisement fails to
mention various taxes, surcharges, and restrictions imposed on
the "discount" ticket.23
This tension between the airlines and consumers resulted in
numerous lawsuits brought by various attorneys general against
the airlines charging them with violations of the states' con-
sumer protection laws. 4 The airlines responded by alleging
that these actions were preempted by federal law.2 5 Thus, the
stage was set for the battle between the states and the airlines,
with the question of federal preemption being the central issue.
This Comment examines the history of federal regulation of
the airline industry and how federal regulation has progressed
to the point of preempting state law. The next Part analyzes
current statutory and case law that has impacted this area. Fi-
nally, this Comment concludes with a discussion of possible
ramifications of the Supreme Court decisions as well as an analy-
sis of the possible future of airline advertising regulations, the
aviation industry, and federal preemption.
II. OVERVIEW OF STATE CONSUMER
PROTECTION LAWS
Beginning in the 1960s, states realized that an increasingly so-
phisticated marketplace was going to cause problems for the av-
21 English, 496 U.S. at 72.
22 See generally infra Part II.
23 See, e.g., infra notes 120 & 128 and accompanying text.
24 See infra subpart V.B and accompanying text.
25 See infra subpart IV.B and accompanying text.
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erage consumer.26  Specifically, deceptive practices were
becoming an increasing problem as sales transactions were be-
coming more impersonal and products were being perceived as
being less reliable.2 7 These problems led to the rise of the "con-
sumer movement" with states passing statutes to protect consum-
ers from unfair and deceptive practices. 28
To combat the problem, a number of generic "model" laws
were proposed to equalize the consumer's position in the sales
transaction. 2  These included the Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (UDTPA), the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices
Act (UCSPA), and the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Act (UTP-CPA). 0
The UDTPA prohibited eleven specific trade practices, in-
cluding "bait and switch" tactics, false or misleading price com-
parisons, and misrepresentations of the origins, standards, and
quality of goods.31 Additionally, the Act had a "catch-all" provi-
sion for "conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of confu-
sion or of misunderstanding."3 2  States that have used the
UDTPA as the basis for their consumer protection laws" have
generally expanded- its scope.3 4
The UCSPA was enacted to provide sellers with more predict-
able standards for their conduct and to protect consumers
against deceptive and unconscionable sales practices.3 5 The
USCPA was basically an attempt to "modernize" consumer sales
practices, to require fairness in sales practices, to make state laws
on consumer sales practice uniform, and to conform state re-
quirements to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) policies.3 6
Kansas, Ohio, and Utah have used the USCPA as a basis for their
consumer statutes.37
26 Albert N. Shelden & Stephen Gardner, A Truncated Overview of State Consumer
Protection Laws, C888 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 375, 380 (1994).
27 Id. at 378, 380.
28 Michael F. Brockmeyer, State Consumer Protection Acts: An Ovendrvew, C401
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 299 (1989).
29 Shelden & Gardner, supra note 26, at 380.
30 Id. at 381.
31 Brockmeyer, supra note 28, at 302.
32 Id.
33 These states include: Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma,. and Oregon. Id.
34 Id.
35 Shelden & Gardner, supra note 26, at 381.
36 Id.
37 Brockmeyer, supra note 28, at 303.
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Perhaps the most influential of the model acts was the UTP-
CPA. The UTP-CPA provides for three variations in its prohibi-
tion of deceptive practices.3 8 First, the UTP-CPA follows the lan-
guage of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act that
prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce. 39 Ap-
proximately twelve states utilize this first alternative as a basis for
their consumer protection laws.4 0 The second alternative pro-
hibits "false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce." 4' Although no state law
mirrors the second alternative, Alabama, Idaho, and Texas have
statutes consisting of a hybrid of alternatives two and three.
42
Finally, under alternative three, the definition of "unlawful con-
duct" includes twelve specific illegal acts relating primarily to
false advertising and also prohibits any act that is unfair or de-
ceptive to the consumer.43 Approximately seven states utilize al-
ternative three.44
In recent years, states have begun to amend their consumer
protection statutes to address specific problem areas. Problem
areas that have been addressed by states include: "lemon laws,"
43
door-to-door solicitations,46 health club contracts, 47 pyramid
schemes,4" and odometer fraud.49
In addition to these problem-specific laws, states have begun
to focus on advertising in an attempt to eliminate false and de-
38 Shelden & Gardner, supra note 26, at 383.
39 Brockmeyer, supra note 28, at 304.
40 Id. These states include: Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine,
.Massachusetts, Montana, North Carolina, South Carolina, Vermont, Washington,
and West Virginia.
41- d.
42 Id. at 304-05.
43 Id. at 305; see also Shelden & Gardner, supra note 26, at 383-84.
- These states include: Alaska, Maryland, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. Brockmeyer, supra note 28, at 304.
45 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II §§ 14-1501 to 14-1504 (1990 & Supp.
1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 407.560-.583 (Vernon 1990 & Supp. 1995).
46 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 501.021-.022 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); OR. REv.
STAT. §§ 83.710-.750 (1993).
47 See, e.g., CAL. CfV. CODE §§ 1812.80-.95 (West 1985); Wis. STAT. § 134.70
(1989 & Supp. 1994).
48 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2561-2564 (1993); MO. ANN. STAT.
§§ 407.400-420 (Vernon 1990 & Supp. 1995); see also People ex rel. Fahner v.
Walsh, 461 N.E.2d 78, 82 (1984) (holding pyramid scheme inherently violative of
state consumer fraud law).
49 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325E.13-.16 (West 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 407.511-.556 (Vernon 1990 & Supp. 1995).
210
REGULATING AIRFARE ADVERTISING
ceptive advertising claims. General deceptive practices have also
been targeted. Examples of categories of activity that violate
states' consumer protection acts are: misrepresentations or non-
disclosure of material facts,5 ° unsubstantiated advertising
claims," and deceptive advertising and pricing claims.52
To supplement their laws, states have also begun to give their
respective attorneys general "broad rule-making, investigatory,
and prosecutorial authority."53 Approximately thirty-five states
give their attorneys general rule-making power by allowing them
to promulgate rules and regulations.54 Additionally, certain
states provide that the regulations have the force of law,55 and
that a violation of a regulation is prima facie evidence of a viola-
tion of the act.56 Further, as part of the investigatory powers
given to the attorneys general, some states permit the attorney
general to issue a civil investigative demand to gain access to
documents or obtain relevant testimony.5 7 Overall, these con-
sumer protection acts have given the attorneys general powers
to ensure that consumers are not being misled in transactions
with sellers.
In conjunction with state regulation, federal "model" laws
have been passed regulating seller-consumer transactions.5 8 As
mentioned above, many of these model laws target false and de-
50 Brockmeyer, supra note 28, at 308 (citing State ex rel. Ashcroft v. Marketing
Unlimited of Am., Inc., 613 S.W.2d 440, 445-47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (holding a
violation occurred when a seller used a fictitious name)); see also Pennington v.
Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 687 (Tex. 1980) (misrepresentation of condition of
boat violated state consumer protection law).
51 Brockmeyer, supra note 28, at 308 (citing Consumer Protection Div. v. Con-
sumer Publishing Co., 501 A.2d 48, 53 (1985) (ordering a company to cease sell-
ing diet pills with the claims that the user will lose weight merely by taking the pill
and that the effectiveness of the pill had been scientifically and clinically tested
when it had not)).
52 Id. at 309 (citing State Kidwell v. Master Distrib., Inc., 615 P.2d 116, 121-22
(Idaho 1980) (holding that deception existed when an advertisement offered dis-
count prices from reference prices at which no sales had occurred and when the
"discount" prices were the seller's regular prices)).
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Shelden & Gardner, supra note 26, at 387; see also MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw
II §§ 13-205 (1990).
56 Shelden & Gardner, supra note 26, at 387. See also ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5,
§ 207(2) (West 1989).
57 Id.; see also MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II §§ 13-405 (1990); N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 63(12) (McKinney 1993); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§. 17.60-.61 (Vernon
1987 & Supp. 1995).
58 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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ceptive advertising.5 9 Recently, however, many national advertis-
ers have begun to attack state consumer laws and enforcement
statutes using preemption as their sword. The advertisers' the-
ory is that they are " 'national' advertisers and therefore not sub-
ject to state enforcement action, but only the rules and
regulations of the federal government."60 This argument, how-
ever, usually fails.61
The reason the argument by the advertisers usually fails is that
protection of consumers from unfair and unlawful practices is
an area traditionally regulated by the states under their police
powers.62 The Supreme Court has recognized that " 'neither
logic nor precedent' leads to a distinction between the state's
ability to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the
state's ability to 'prevent the deception of consumers.' "6 Addi-
tionally, "[w] hen dealing with areas traditionally within a state's
police powers, those arguing for preemption 'must overcome
the presumption against finding preemption of state law in ar-
eas traditionally regulated by the states.' "6
Actioris against sellers are not being brought solely by the at-
torneys general of the states. There appears to be a rise in the
number of suits brought by private litigants to enforce state con-
sumer protection laws.65 The reason appears to be that some of
the new consumer statutes allow prevailing consumers to re-
cover attorneys' fees and costs. 66 But to prevent the filing of an
unmanageable number of private suits, some of the acts require
that a consumer suffer actual damages before bringing an
action.67
The effect of the federal "model" laws and the state consumer
protection laws is clear. Sellers must be careful of the practices
they engage in because there are numerous watchdog groups
who closely monitor the situation. Further, and on a much
smaller level, advertising is now being examined with the prover-
59 See, e.g., supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
60 Shelden & Gardner, supra. note 26, at 389.
61 Id.
62 Id.; see also California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989); Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146 (1963).
63 Shelden & Gardner, supra note 26, at 390 (citing F/orida Lime & Avocado
Growers, 373 U.S. at 146).
64 Id. (citing ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 101).
65 Id. at 391.
66 Id.; see CAL. Crv. CODE § 1780 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995); TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE § 17.50 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1995).
67 Shelden & Gardner, supra note 26, at 391.
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bial "fine tooth comb." Not only do watchdog groups monitor
various advertisements, but consumers, aware of their respective
state consumer protection laws, now have a private cause of ac-
tion against companies and national advertisers.
III. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL REGULATION
OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
A. CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT OF 1938
"Airplanes 'move only by federal permission, subject to fed-
eral inspection, in the hands of federally certified personnel and
under an intricate system of federal commands. The moment a
ship taxis onto a runway it is caught up in an elaborate and de-
tailed system of controls.' "68 This complex system of federal
controls over the aviation industry began when Congress passed
the Air Commerce Act of 192669 (the 1926 Act). The 1926 Act
authorized the Secretary of Commerce to regulate both the de-
sign of aircraft and the materials and methods used in their
construction.7 0
The 1926 Act was repealed by the Civil Aeronautics Act of
193871 (the 1938 Act), which extended federal jurisdiction over
air commerce primarily through the use of Congress' Com-
merce Clause powers. As part of the 1938 Act, the Civil Aero-
nautics Authority was created, which was later changed to the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in 1940.72 In general, the CAB
was charged with the "regulation of commercial aviation."7 3
The 1938 Act also contained a savings clause which stated that
the Act would not "abridge or alter the remedies now existing at
68 Daniel Petroski, Airlines'Response to the DTPA Section 1305 Preemption, 56J. AIR
L. & CoM. 125, 125 (1990) (citing New England lgal Found. v. Massachusetts
Port Auth., 883 F.2d 157, 172 (1st Cir. 1989), quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
69 Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568, repealed by Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 1107, 52 Stat. 973.
70 Id. at 569.
7 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973, repealed by Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 1401(b), 72 Stat. 731 (codified at 49
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1557 (1988)); see also Lance M. Harvey, Note, Cleveland v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., The Tenth Circuit Holds that the Federal Aviation Act of. 1958 Does Not
Preempt State Common Law Claims for Negligent Design, 46 BAYLOR L. REv. 485
(1994); StuartJ. Starry, Torts at Twenty Thousand Feet: Federal Preemption in Commer-
cial Aviation, 23 FALL BRIEF-A.B.A. SEC. TORT & INS. PRAc. 8 (1993).
72 Harvey, supra note 71, at 485; see also Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Utils.
Comm'n, 644 F.2d 1334, 1336 (9th Cir. 1981).
73 Harvey, supra note 71, at 485.
1995] 213
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
common law or by statute, but that the provisions of this Act
would be in addition to such remedies." 74 As used in the 1938
Act, the savings clause does not restrict common law or previ-
ously existing remedies available to a plaintiff. This savings
clause is important because it is the authority the states rely on
when regulating the conduct of airlines.
B. FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958
Subsequent to the 1938 Act, the Federal Aviation Act of
195875 (the 1958 Act) was passed. The 1958 Act repealed the
1938 Act, but it retained the CAB from the 1938 Act7 6 and cre-
ated the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA). 7 In addition, the 1958
Act divided the responsibility of regulating aviation into two
components: the FAA was responsible for flight safety; the CAB
was responsible for economic regulation.78
With the creation of the FAA, the government finally had an
agency whose sole responsibility was the governing of aviation
safety.79 Additional responsibilities of the FAA include: certifica-
tion of airplanes, pilots, and mechanics; the establishment of air-
craft maintenance requirements; and the establishment of a
national system of airways for both civil and military aircraft.80
Thus the federal government "bears virtually complete responsi-
bility for the promotion and supervision of [the airline] industry
in the public interest."81 Finally, the 1958 Act retained the sav-
ings clause from the 1938 Act, giving the states continued com-
mon law and statutory remedies for both airline negligence and
false advertising claims.82
74 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 49 U.S.C. § 1106, 52 Stat. 973, 1027; see also
Harvey, supra note 71, at 8. In general, a savings clause is defined as "a clause in a
statute restricting the scope of the repeal of prior statutes"; additionally, it is "lan-
guage inserted in a statute to maintain the force of the law repealed as to existing
rights." BARRON's LAw DIriONARY 432 (3d ed. 1991).
75 Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1557 (1988)).
76 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1324 (1988).
77 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
78 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1324, 1341-1359 (1988).
79 Harvey, supra note 71, at 487.
80 Id. at 487-88.
81 Id. at 488 (citing S. REP. No. 1811, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1958)).
82 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 1106, 72 Stat. 731 (codi-
fied at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
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C. AIRLINE DEREGULATION Acr OF' 1978
Twenty years after the passage of the 1958 Act, the economic
conditions of the commercial airline industry dictated that the
strict regulation of the industry needed to be lessened. Con-
gress responded with ,the passage of the Airline Deregulation
Act of 197883 (the ADA). The ADA was an attempt by Congress
to develop an air transportation system that "relies on competi-
tive market forces to determine the quality, variety, and price of
airline services."8 4
With Congress viewing the adoption of the ADA as "over-
haul [ing] the aviation regulatory system,""' the commercial avia-
tion industry was basically transformed overnight into a
deregulated industry. Included in this transformation was the
dismantling of the CAB and its oversight of the aviation indus-
try.86 Prior to the enactment of the ADA, the CAB possessed the
authority to set interstate rates8 7 and to take action against the
airlines for deceptive trade practices.8 8
With the airline industry now wide open due to deregulation,
issues such as prices, routes, and services became extremely
competitive. Commercial airlines were now free to set their own
rates, and the competition to attract the flying public became
intense. An offshoot" of deregulation was the aptly named
"airfare wars," the various frequent flyer programs, and the
heavy advertising many of the airlines began to run. 9
With the airlines trying to attract more consumers, advertising
became the primary means of attracting the target consumer.90
In this battle to gain customers, many airlines began to use alleg-
edly deceptive advertising techniques.9' It is these allegedly de-
83 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705.
84 StuartJ. Starry, Federal Preemption in Commercial Aviation: Tort Litigation Under
49 U.S.C. Section 1305, 58J. AIR L. & COM. 657 (1993) (citing Airline Deregula-
tion Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705).
85 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773, 3774.
86 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992).
87 Id.
88 Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 793, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 3-4 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2857, 2860.
89 See, e.g., infra note 120.
90 See Eric W. Maclure, Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.: Federal.Preemption
Provision Clips States' Wings On Regulation of Air Fare Advertising, 71 N.C. L. REv.
905, 907-08 (1993) (discussing attempt by National Association of Attorneys Gen-
eral to enforce state laws relating to deceptive advertising).
91 Id.; see also infra note 128 and accompanying text.
1995] 215
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
ceptive practices and the states' response to them that is the
focus of this Comment.
Although the ADA effectively dismantled the regulatory over-
sight previously enjoyed by the federal government, it did not
repeal the savings clause promulgated in the 1938 and 1958
Acts.9 2 Congress, in order to prevent the states from stepping
into the shoes of the federal government and "filling the regula-
tory void created by the [ADA],"g enacted a federal preemption
provision at section 105 of the ADA.94
The preemption provision reads, in pertinent part, "[A] state
.. may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provi-
sion having the force and effect of law related to a price, route,
or service of an air carriet that may provide air transportation
under this subpart."95 Because almost any type of lawsuit can
have a regulatory effect on airline conduct, some courts have
interpreted this preemption provision to mean that all state
common law claims are preempted so long as they relate to the
prices, routes, or services of an airline.96
As demonstrated below, there is an inherent conflict between
the preemption provision and the savings clause left untouched
by the ADA. The savings clause allows for existing common law
and statutory remedies, while the preemption provision of the
ADA seemingly preempts claims that relate to prices, routes, or
services of an airline. Further, because the language of the pre-
emption provision has been interpreted so broadly,97 states have
had a difficult time trying to enforce their consumer protection
laws against the airlines. 9
D. 1984 CAB SUNSET ACT
The final link in the chain of federal regulation of the airline
industry is arguably the CAB Sunset Act of 198499 (Sunset Act).
In general, the SunsetAct terminated or transferred the remain-
92 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705.
93 Starry, supra note 71, at 8.
94 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. § 105, 92 Stat. 1705, 1708 (codi-
fied at 49 U.S.C. § 1305 (1988)).
95 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (1995). This provision was recodified in 1994 as part of
the congressional revision of Title 49, dealing with transportation. See infra sub-
part III.E for a discussion of this recodification and its impact.
96 Starry, supra note 84, at 657; see also infra Part IV.
97 See generally Maclure, supra note 90; Starry, supra note 84.
98 See infra Part V.
99 Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat 1703 (1984).
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ing functions of the CAB to the Department of Transportation
(DOT).1°° The Sunset Act did not make substantive changes in
either the savings clause or the preemption provision. 1" The
legislative history of the Sunset Act shows that the authority to
protect consumers and to prevent unfair competitive practices,
should be exercised by the DOT.102
Thus the structure of the agencies that govern the commer-
cial aviation industry is as follows: the authority over the industry
regarding unfair and deceptive practices generally belongs to
the DOT; states are preempted by federal law if the regulation
or lawsuit concerns prices, routes, or services; and while there is
a savings clause that permits existing common law and statutory
remedies, it does not seem to replace the preemption provision
in the eyes of the various courts that have dealt with the conflict
between the two provisions.
E. 1994 REVISION OF TiTL= 49
In 1994, Congress undertook the daunting task of revising Ti-
de 49 of the United States Code, which primarily deals with
transportation issues.10 3 The purpose of this revision of Tide 49
was to "revise, codify, and enact without substantive change cer-
tain general and permanent laws, related to transportation."10 4
This recodification changed the section numbers from the pre-
vious acts. The preemption provision previously discussed has
been changed from 49 U.S.C. section 1305 to 49 U.S.C. section
41713(b).10 5 Additionally, the savings clause is now codified at
49 U.S.C. section 40120(c), changed from 49 U.S.C. section
1506.106 It now provides that "a remedy under this part is in
100 Id.; see also TWA v. Mattox, 897 F.2d 773, 777 (5th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 504 U.S.
374 (1992).
101 Id. at 778.
102 H.R. REP. No. 793, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2857, 2860-62. On the topic of federal regulations and preemption
of state law, the report states that "federal regulation insures a uniform system of
regulation by the states. If there was no Federal regulation ... the regulations
could vary from state to state. This would be confusing and burdensome to air-
line passengers, as well as to the airlines." Id. at 2860. Further, the report states
that "the Department of Transportation is the most appropriate agency to admin-
ister CAB's consumer protection and unfair competitive practice authorities." Id.
at 2862.
103 Revision of Title 49 U.S.C., "Transportation", Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat.
745 (1994).
104 Id.
105 See disposition table at the beginning of revised Title 49.
106 Id.
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addition to any other remedies provided by law." 107 Other pro-
visions have been changed as well. 10 8
IV. CURRENT STATUTORY AND CASE LAW
INTERPRETING THE PREEMPTION LANGUAGE
A. STATUTORY LAW
1. 49 U.S.C. section 41713(b)
As mentioned above, the statutory grant of power to the fed-
eral government to preempt state law claims is located in Title
49, section 41713(b) of the United States Code. 1°9 This section
gives the federal government the power to preempt state law
claims relating to the prices, routes, or services of an air carrier.
2. 49 U.S.C. section 40120
Providing the needed authority for the state law claims (and
thus giving rise to the tension discussed in this Comment) is the
savings clause located in Title 49, section 40120 of the United
States Code. This section provides for additional remedies
along with those provided by common law.110 The savings
clause is in direct conflict with the preemption clause because it
provides for additional common law and statutory remedies
other than those provided in--the acts while the preemption
clause preempts state claims granted by the savings clause. As
discussed below, courts have had a difficult time reconciling
these two sections.
B. CASE LAw
The case law that has interpreted the language of the preemp-
tion provision is perhaps an even better source for preemption
than the actual statutes. The focus of many of the court deci-
107 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) (1995).
108 For a complete disposition of Tide 49 sections and their new numbers, see
the disposition table at the beginning of Tite 49. For purposes of this Comment,
the references to the provisions detailed above will be given in the revised section
numbers. Nevertheless, in footnotes and to the extent needed in other areas,
references will be given to both the revised section numbers and the section
numbers as they existed before congressional recodification. Finally, because the
codification was enacted "without substantive change," references to legislative
history will be from both pre-codification and post-codification sources. See supra
notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
109 See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
110 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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sions has centered on the language of the preemption clause
and just how broadly it should be interpreted.
1. Pre-Morales Case Law
People v. Western Airlines, Inc."' was decided prior to the termi-
nation of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). In Western Airlines
the state of California sued the defendant airlines for allegedly
violating unfair competition and false advertising statutes' 12 by
making misleading statements implying fare savings in advertis-
ing fare promotions. In its defense the airline asserted that the
state claim was preempted under Title 49, section 1305 (now
section 41713) of the United States Code. In addition, the air-
line asserted that the claim violated the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution, and that the Civil Aeronautics Board
had primary jurisdiction over deceptive advertising complaints
and, therefore, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
The Superior Court of San Diego County, ruling in favor of
the defendants, held that the complaint was preempted by fed-
eral law.'1 3 After a discussion of the general language of sec-
tions 1305 (the preemption provision) and 1506 (the savings
clause), the court went on to discuss whether the claim was pre-
empted. The court stated that although the CAB had the
power, in the public interest, to regulate unfair competition and
deceptive practices by interstate air carriers, "nothing in the
Federal Aviation Program suggests by granting the Board such
authority Congress intended to prevent states from also regulat-
ing deceptive advertising practices by interstate air carriers." ' 14
The court went further and found that California's enforce-
ment of its false advertising statutes did not impede Congress'
objectives in enforcing its Federal Aviation Program." 5 Addi-
tionally, the court relied on the section 1506 savings clause (now
49 U.S.C.A. section 40120) and observed that, because the sav-
ings clause preserves existing common law and statutory reme-
dies while providing additional remedies, "state regulation of
interstate air carriers is preempted only where the federal and
state regulatory schemes conflict irreconcilably."" 6 Finally, the
- 202 Cal. Rptr. 237 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985).
112 For a discussion of California's false advertising and unfair competition stat-
utes, see infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
13 Western Airlines, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
14 Id. at 239.
115 Id.
116 Id. (citing Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. 426 U.S. 290, 299 (1976)).
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court addressed the defendant airline's Commerce Clause argu-
ment. It held that California's false advertising statute did not,
as a matter of law, discriminate against air carriers engaged in
interstate air commerce or impinge upon an area of commerce
requiring uniform regulation.' 17
The Western Airlines case was the first in a series of cases ad-
dressing federal preemption of state consumer protection laws.
The court relied on the strict language of the federal statute
giving the CAB power to regulate air carrier deceptive practices.
The court noted, however, that the federal power was not an
exclusive power; rather, it was concurrent with the state's power
to regulate air carriers. Thus, the groundwork was set for other
courts to find that the state law claims are not preempted.
The next in the series of cases that dealt with the subject of
federal preemption of state consumer protection laws was Cali-
fornia v. Trans World Airlines."8 In this case, the state of Califor-
nia sued the defendant airline alleging that its advertising
violated the state consumer protection law.119 The plaintiff al-
leged that, in the course of advertising and selling passenger
travel, the defendant airline violated various sections of the Cali-
fornia Business and Professional Code.12° The plaintiff origi-
nally filed suit in state court; the defendant removed the case to
federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, and
the federal court was to decide if the case was to be heard in the
state or the federal court.
The court held that the plaintiff could not bring an action
under the Federal Aviation Act to enjoin the airline advertising
17 Id. at 239-40.
li 720 F. Supp. 826 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
119 California's consumer protection statute provides:
It is unlawful for any person, firm, corporation, or association ... to
induce the public to enter into any obligation ... to make or dis-
serninate or cause to be made or disseminated before the public ...
in any newspaper or other publication, or any advertising device ...
any statement... which is untrue or misleading ....
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 1994). The statute also provides that it is
unlawful for any person, firm, corporation, or association "to make or dissemi-
nate or cause to be so made or disseminated any such statement as part of a plan
or scheme ... not to sell such personal property or services... so advertised at
the price stated therein, or as so advertised." Id.
120 The defendant's ad advertised in large print a fare of $219 to London. In
much smaller print, the ad stated that the price was "each way based on round-
trip purchase." California, 720 F. Supp. at 827. In addition, in even smaller print,
the ad stated that the fare did "not include $23 U.S. departure tax, security
surcharges, federal inspection fees, and other gov't taxes." Id.
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because only the administrator of the FAA may institute a civil
action against an airline for a violation of the statute. 2 1 The
court additionally held that even if federal law did preempt state
regulation of airline advertising, because the Federal Aviation
Act gave the plaintiff no cause of action, the plaintiff could nev-
ertheless bring suit to enforce its alleged right in state court. 22
In finding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction, the
federal court remanded the case to the state court.1 23
The key to whether federal law preempts state law has always
been both statutory intent and the language used.2 4 In holding
that federal law did not preempt the state law claim, it appears
that the federal court took a very narrow reading of the statutory
language, similar to the reading taken in the Western Airlines.
In a case decided one month after California v. Trans World
Airlines, a New York district court faced facts similar to California
and reached a similar decision. In New York v. Trans World Air-
lines 2 5 the state of New York, in a suit related to the California
case, 1 6 sued the defendant airlines alleging a violation of the
state deceptive advertising laws.' 2 7 The advertisement was simi-
lar to the California advertisement. 28
121 Id. at 828. The subsequently revised statute used by the court in its analysis
is codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1471 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
122 California, 720 F. Supp. at 828.
123 Id. at 829.
124 See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
125 728 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
126 The suits brought by both California and New York relate to a letter written
by the Texas attorney general to various airlines alleging violations of the respec-
tive state consumer protection laws. For a full discussion of the actions initiated
by the Texas attorney general, see infra subpart IV.B.2 and accompanying text.
127 New York law gives the attorney general the power to apply for an order
enjoining a person or business from continuing "fraudulent or illegal acts." N.Y.
ExEc. LAw § 63(12) (McKinney 1993). The statute goes on to define fraud as
including "any device, scheme or artifice to defraud and any deception, misrepre-
sentation, concealment ... false promise or unconscionable contractual provi-
sions." Id. Additionally, "false advertising in the conduct of any business, trade
or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state is hereby declared
unlawful." N.Y. GEN. Bus. Lw § 350 (McKinney 1988). Finally, section 350-a of
New York's General Business Law Code defines false advertising in great detail.
The section states that "false advertising means advertising ... misleading in a
material respect." In determining if an advertisement is misleading,'"the extent
to which the advertsing fails to reveal facts material. . . under such conditions as
are customary or usual." Id.
128 The advertisement at issue was dated September 14, 1988, and was located
in the New York Times. It read: "London Roundtrip + Hotel + Car = $298." This
dollar figure implied that a consumer could travel to London, stay in a hotel, and
have the use of a rental car for $298. In small print and a footnote below the
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In its opinion, the New York court took a narrow approach
similar to the California court. The court held that the preemp-
tion clause of the Federal Aviation Act did not preempt New
York's claim against the defendant airlines. 29 The court used a
"remote and indirect" standard to support this conclusion. Spe-
cifically, the court stated that "any relationship between New
York's enforcement of its laws against deceptive advertising and
Pan Am's rates, routes and services is remote and indirect...
[New York's] sole concern is with the manner in which Pan Am
advertises ... to New York consumers."130
The court also addressed the "relate to" language and dis-
cussed the effects a broad reading could have on state law
claims. In this discussion the court stated that "the interpreta-
tion of section [1305] Pan Am urges on this court stretches that
section's 'relating to' phrase too far. To find that Congress in-
tended section [1305] . . . to preempt New York's laws against
deceptive advertising conceivably could doom every state regula-
tion affecting airlines."1 3 1 In concluding its discussion on fed-
eral preemption of the New York action, the court describes
deceptive advertising as an area that does not require an "exclu-
sive federal presence."1 3 2 In light of the decision that the claim
was not federally preempted, the court removed the action and
remanded the case to the New York state court.
On remand, the case was decided in the supreme court of
New York County.1 33 In a short and rather surprising decision
the court held that the state action was preempted, despite a
contrary decision by the federal court that remanded the case.
The court gave little explanation as to why the state claims were
preempted. The court merely cited the legislative history and
headline, however, it was stated that the hotel was in the English countryside, not
London, and was available only to those travelers who first paid for three consec-
utive nights in a London hotel. The rental car was free for only the first three
days, after which it was "only $17 a day." Additionally, the fare did not include
U.S. departure tax, security surcharge, and the rental car charge omitted fuel
surcharges, taxes, and various optional items. According to the state, the total
additional charges increased the package's total cost to a minimum of $721 and a
maximum of $1,418. Similar advertisements were run by both Trans World Air-
lines and Pan American Airlines throughout the next year. New York, 728 F.
Supp. at 167.
129 Id. at 176.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 178.
133 People v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 147 Misc. 2d 697, 556 N.Y.S.2d 803
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990).
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the practices of the Department of Transportation as authority
for finding "that Congress intended to preempt and exclude
state law in the field."1 3
4
The final case in the series of cases leading up to the Morales
decision is Kansas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.135 In a pattern sim-.
ilar to that in the previously discussed cases, the Kansas attorney
general sued the defendant airline under the Kansas Consumer
Protection Statute. This action asserted a violation of the statute
in connection with various newspaper advertisements. 3 6 The
case was removed to federal court and the plaintiff sought re-
mand to the state court based on the ground that the federal
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
At issue was the defendant's contention that the claim was
preempted by federal law and thus remand was unwarranted.
Consistent with' the preceding cases, however, the judge held
that the plaintiff's claim was not preempted by federal law and
remanded the case back to state court.3 7 Specifically, the court
scrutinized the language of the preemption section and came
up with the new idea that "the language of the preemption sec-
tion precluding regulation 'relating to rates, routes or services'
does not by its terms include advertising." 38  The court also
took notice of the decisions of other federal courts that had re-
manded similar cases to state courts.1 39
With the exception of the New York decision that federal law
preempted state law, the conclusions running through the pre-
Morales cases appear to be twofold. First, the courts appear to
have taken a strict reading of the preemption provision and its
language. Second, due to the strict reading of the statutes in
favor of state regulation, the courts have held that federal law
13 Id. at 702.
135 730 F. Supp. 366 (D. Kan. 1990).
136 The Kansas consumer protection statute is located in Kansas Statutes Anno-
tated (K.S.A.) section 50-623. It states that the Act "shall promote the following
policies: (a) To simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing consumer
transactions; (b) to protect consumers from suppliers who commit deceptive and
unconscionable practices... " KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-623 (1994). Further, K.S.A.
section 50-626 describes various deceptive acts and practices and K.S.A. section
50-627 describes unconscionable acts and practices. These statutes, along with
K.S.A. section 50-623, comprise the Kansas state consumer protection laws at is-
sue in the Kansas case.
137 Kansas, 730 F. Supp. at 368.
138 Id. (citing People v. Western Airlines, Inc., 202 Cal. Rptr. 237 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985)).
139 Id. at 368-69. The court noted that "federal district courts in New York,
Illinois and California have remanded similar cases to state courts." Id.
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did not preempt state law. Because state law was not preempted,
the state claims relating to the violations of the consumer pro-
tection statutes were generally allowed to go forward in the state
courts.
The essence of the pre-Moralesjurisprudence can be captured
in one word: confusing. Courts analyzing the same issue have
come to diametrically opposed conclusions and, as seen in the
New York cases, even courts within the same circuit have reached
different results. This confusion between the courts as to ex-
actly when federal law preempts state law in the field of air carri-
ers led the Supreme Court to accept the Morales case and
attempt. to clear up the mess created by the lower courts.
2. The Morales Trilogy
One of the seminal cases dealing with the issue of federal pre-
emption under the Federal Aviation Act is the Morales case. The
case culminated with the Supreme Court's decision in 1992. As
the case went-up through the district court and the court of ap-
peals, however, insight as to the courts' views of the preemption
language was pr6vided. This section examines each of the three
cases in detail to reveal the needed insight of the preemption
language as the courts understand it.
The original case in the Morales trilogy is Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Mattox.140 Before discussing the case, it is necessary to
understand the background leading up to the suits.
In 1988, the National Association of Attorneys General
(NAAG)14 1 adopted guidelines on advertising and marketing
practices in the airline industry (the NAAG Guidelines). 142
While the NAAG Guidelines did not have the force of law, they
140 712 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Tex. 1989).
141 The National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) is an association of
approximately 50 attorneys general representing each of the 50 states and U.S.
territories. NAAG was founded in 1907 and is currently run by an executive com-
mittee consisting of various elected attorneys general from different states. One
of the major areas of emphasis in which NAAG has become involved is the regula-
tion of advertising of air fares. NAAG has issued formal guidelines regulating
these activities. While these guidelines do not create new laws or regulations,
NAAG attorneys "clearly intended them to have the force of law." Luther C. Mc-
Kinney & DeweyJ. Caton, What To Do When the Attorney General Calls: State Regula-
tion Of National Advertising, 3 DEPAUL Bus. LJ. 119 (1991).
142 Maclure, supra note 92, at 907 (citing NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATroRm's
GENERAL, TASK FORCE ON THE AIR TRAVEL INDUSTRY, REVISED GUIDELINES (1988)




did provide standards against which the airlines could assess
whether a practice violated current state consumer protection
statutes. 143 Subsequent to the issuance of these standards, the
attorneys general of seven states' 44 sent an advisory memoran-
dum to major airlines cautioning that failure to disclose all fare
surcharges conflicted with the NAAG Guidelines and repre-
sented a violation of state laws on deceptive advertising and un-
fair trade practices.1 45 The memorandum was described as a
possible precursor to judicial action and the attorneys general
urged the airlines to immediately comply with the NAAG Guide-
lines. 1' Nine months later, the Texas attorney general sent a
letter to several major airlines announcing an intent to sue. 47
Before the attorneys general could act, however, the airlines
sued, claiming that the states were precluded from regulating
airfare advertising by the preemption provision of the Airline
Deregulation Act.1 48 It is this suit by the airlines that begins the
Morales trilogy.
As described above, the airlines 49 sued the attorneys general
seeking a preliminary injunction preventing the Texas attorney
general from bringing an enforcement action against them
under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.1'0 The airlines
argued the state enforcement action was preempted by federal
law-specifically, the preemption provision of the Airline De-
regulation Act. Using this reasoning, the district court granted
the airlines' motion for injunction preventing the attorneys gen-
eral from taking enforcement action. The court reasoned that
the "[p]laintiffs will prevail in establishing their claims that any
state regulation of advertising of the [airlines'] rates, routes, and
143 Id.
-4 The states included: Colorado, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York,
Texas, and Wisconsin. Id. at 927.
145 Morales, 504 U.S. at 379. Section 2.5 of the NAAG Guidelines, titled
"Surcharges", provides that "[a] ny fuel, tax, or other surcharge to a fare must be
included in the total advertised price of the fare." Id. at 405.
146 Maclure, supra note 90, at 908 (citing Morales, 504 U.S. at 379-80).
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 The airlines that originally brought suit were Trans World Airlines, Conti-
nental, and British Airways. Trans World Airlines v. Mattox, 712 F. Supp. 99, 102
(W.D. Tex. 1989).
150 Id. at 99. The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act provides that "[fialse,
misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or com-
merce are hereby declared unlawful and are subject to action by the consumer
protection division .... " TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (Vernon 1987 &
Supp. 1995).
1995] 225
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
services has been preempted by the Federal Government."151 In
addition to granting the injunction, the court broadened the
injunction to include thirty-three other states.1 52
The next case in the Morales trilogy is the appeal to the Fifth
Circuit.' The question decided by the court of appeals was, at
its simplest, whether state laws proscribing deceptive advertising
are preempted by federal law when the state attempts to enforce
such laws against the advertising of airline fares.' 54
The arguments advanced by both the airlines and the Texas
attorney general provide the base arguments at the center of
this issue. The airlines contended that section 105(a) (1) of the
ADA 55 expressly preempted state laws pertaining to the adver-
tising of air fares by airlines. 5 To counter, the Texas attorney
general, joined by the other state attorneys general, argued that
the "state has the power to regulate the deceptive advertising of
fares ... [because] section 105 only preempts state regulations
relating to the rates, routes, or services of airlines, but does not
expressly preclude state regulations relating to all airline opera-
tions."157 The Texas attomey general went on to cite the legisla-
tive history of the preemption section in arguing that there was
no indication of congressional intent to preempt state regula-
tion of deceptive fare advertising by airlines. 58 The airlines
countered that the language of the preemption provision is
clear and applies to all laws relating to rates, routes, or services
of airlines, and that the advertising of fares by airlines "clearly
relates to rates."5 9
In addition to the foregoing argument, the attorneys general
cited three decisions supporting their position. 6° The court of
appeals, however, did not accept the State's arguments against
preemption. The court expressly cited the legislative history of
the preemption provision in showing congressional intent to ex-
pressly preempt state regulation of airfare advertising. 6' The
15, Trans World Airlines, 712 F. Supp. at 101.
152 Id. at 105-06.
153 TWA v. Mattox, 897 F.2d 773 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 926 (1990).
154 Id. at 775.
155 Now 49 U.S.C. § 41713.




160 See supra subpart IV.B.1 for a full discussion of the cases cited by the attor-
neys general to support state regulation.
161 Id. at 782.
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court also gave a definition of "relates to" when it stated that "a
law relates to a particular subject 'if it has a connection with or
reference to' that subject."1 62 Using this definition, the court
went on to hold that "such [state consumer protection] laws do
'relate to' rates when applied to airline fare advertising. " 16
Perhaps believing they still had a chance to convince the
court otherwise, the state attorneys general pointed to the sav-
ings clause that survived the Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset
Act."6 In general, the attorneys general pointed out that the
savings clause preserved remedies existing at common law and
that this provision allowed them to enforce their states' decep-
tive advertising laws as an additional remedy.1 65 The court, how-
ever, did not agree and noted that the savings clause did not
preserve state law remedies when there was express preemption
under the preemption provision.166
To summarize, the court felt that it was indeed Congress' in-
tention to retain the exclusive authority to regulate the advertis-
ing of airfares. Thus, in affirming the district court's injunction,
the court held that the state enforcement actions were pre-
empted by federal law.
. The Supreme Court originally denied certiorari of this case.' 67
Nevertheless, in a later case, the district court made the injunc-
tion permanent and the Fifth Circuit again affirmed." The
case was appealed to the Supreme Court, and the decision that
was rendered became a key decision in the field of federal pre-
emption in the airline industry.
This final and most important case in the Morales trilogy is the
seminal Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc."6 9 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to address whether the preemption
provision of the Airline Deregulation Act prohibits the states
162 Id. at 783 (footnote omitted).
163 Id.
164 Id. For a discussion of the definition of a savings clause, see supra note 74
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the savings clause cited by the state
attorneys general, see supra note 94 and accompanying text.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 498 U.S. 926 (1990).
168 Maclure, supra note 90, at 927 (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Morales,
949 F.2d 141, 144-45 (5th Cir. 1991), aff'd in part, rel'd in part, 504 U.S. 374, 390
(1992)).
169 504 U.S. at 374. Dan Morales replaced Jim Mattox as Texas Attorney Gen-
eral in 1990, thus accounting for the change in names between the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
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from utilizing their consumer protection statutes to prevent al-
legedly deceptive airfare advertising.170
As mentioned above,1 7 1 the airlines sued to enjoin state attor-
neys general from enforcing state deceptive practices laws
against airline advertising. In a five-to-three decision, the Court
held that the "fare advertising provisions of the NAAG Guide-
lines are preempted by the ADA."'7 The majority opinion, au-
thored by Justice Scalia, 173 can be broken down into two primary
areas of discussion. First, the opinion discusses the scope of the
"relate to" clause in the ADA. Second, after determining the
scope of the "relate to" clause, the opinion looks at the NAAG
Guidelines 174 in an attempt to determine if the guidelines fell
within the scope of the ADA's "relate to" clause and therefore
whether they should be preempted. 175
The first area of analysis concerns the "relate to" clause of the
ADA.' 76 To determine the proper scope of the clause, the ma-
jority looked to a line of cases in which the Court had inter-
preted a similarly worded clause in a preemption provision of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974177 (ER-
ISA). The clause in the ERISA statute states that the provisions
of the law "supersede any and all state laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." 78  A
brief analysis of select ERISA cases follows.
The first of the ERISA cases is Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc.,179 a case involving a NewJersey statute. The Court realized
its first chance to address whether ERISA preempts state law
170 Id. at 378.
171 See supra subpart IV.B.2 and accompanying text.
172 Maclure, supra note 90, at 909 (citing Morales, 504 U.S. at 390-91).
173 The majority opinion was written by Justice Scalia. He was joined by Jus-
tices White, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justice Souter took no part in the
decision.
174 For a discussion of the National Association of Attorneys General and the
guidelines promulgated by them, see supra note 141 and accompanying text.
175 Maclure, supra note 90, at 909-10.
176 Section 105 of the ADA reads in pertinent part: "[A] state ... may not enact
or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law
related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air transpor-
tation ... ." (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ app. 1301-1592 (1988 & Supp.
IV 1993)). It is this clause that the majority opinion focuses on in its attempt to
determine if the NAAG guidelines are preempted.
177 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
178 Maclure, supra note 90, at 910 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988 & Supp. V
1993)).
179 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
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under the preemption provision. In a unanimous decision by
eight Justices, the Court found federal preemption to be contin-
gent upon a showing of congressional intent or upon a conclu-
sion that the "nature of the regulated subject" allows for nothing
but preemption.1 80
In Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,1 81 the Court broadened its read-
ing of the ERISA preemption provision. In holding that state
law. is again preempted, the unanimous opinion, written by Jus-
tice Blackmun, stated that a "law 'relates to' an employee benefit
plan ... if it has a connection with or reference to such a
plan."18 2
Two years later, the Court decided Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co. v. Massachusetts.18 3 In holding that the Massachusetts statute
was preempted by ERISA, the Court implicitly affirmed the
broad reading of the preemption provision taken in Shaw.' 4
Additionally, this case pointed out the importance of congres-
sional intent in the preemption analysis by stating that the key to
determining if federal law preempts a state statute "is to ascer-
tain Congress' intent in enacting the federal statute at issue."1 m
The final case is FMC Corp. v. Holliday.18 6 The Court again
applied its broad "reference to" or "connection to" test to pre-
empt state law. With this decision, the Court solidified the fact
that it was taking a broad reading of the ERISA preemption
clause.
As applied to -the preemption provision of the ADA, Justice
Scalia used the same standard as that used in the ERISA cases.
Specifically, he stated that "the ordinary meaning of [relate to]
is a broad one . . .," that since the Court has "held that a state
law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan. . . 'if it has a connec-
tion with or reference to such a plan," and that "[s] ince the rele-
vant language of the ADA is identical, we think it appropriate to
adopt the same standard here: State enforcement actions having
a connection with or reference to airline '[prices], routes, or
180 Maclure, supra note 90, at 916 (citing Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,
451 U.S. 504, 522 (1981)).
181 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
182 Maclure, supra note 90, at 916 (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97).
18 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
184 Maclure, supra note 90, at 917 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massa-
chusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985)).
185 Metropolitan, 471 U.S. at 738.
186 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
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services' are preempted.... "17 Thus, the Court took a broad
reading of the ADA preemption provision similar to that taken
in the ERISA cases.
Once the Court determined the broad scope of the "relate to"
clause in the ADA, the second area of discussion for the Court
was to determine if the NAAG Guidelines "related to" prices,
rates or routes.""8 The Court appeared to have no trouble deter-
mining that the NAAG Guidelines indeed related to prices,
rates, or routes due to the Guidelines' express language and po-
tential impact on the airlines.18 9 In analyzing the effect of the
Guidelines, the Court focused on section 2.4,190 which requires
that advertised airline fares be available to meet reasonably fore-
seeable demand. In concluding that requirements such as sec-
tion 2.4 clearly affect prices, routes, or services, Justice Scalia
sums up his position by stating that "[a] 11 in all, the obligations
imposed by the guidelines would have a significant impact upon
the airlines' ability to market their product, and hence a signifi-
cant impact on the fares they charge." 191
Perhaps realizing the impact this holding may have on other
aspects of state regulation, the majority attempted to limit the
scope of the decision by stating that the holding does not "ad-
dress whether state regulation of the nonprice aspects of fare
advertising (for example, state laws preventing obscene depic-
tions) would similarly 'relat[e] to' rates."1 92 To further dilute
the decision, the majority opinion states that its decision will not
give the airlines "carte blanche to lie and deceive consumers;
the [Department of Transportation] retains the power to pro-
hibit advertisements which in its opinion do not further compet-
itive pricing."M9 3 To summarize, the majority opinion held that
the NAAG Guidelines "relate to" prices, routes, or serviGes, and
are thus preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act.
187 Morales, 504 U.S. at 384 (citations omitted).
188 Maclure, supra note 90, at 910.
189 Id. The complete NAAG Guidelines are reprinted in an appendix to the
Morales opinion.
190 Section 2.4 of the NAAG Guidelines states that "[a]ny advertised fare must
be available in sufficient quantity so as to meet reasonably foreseeable demand
on every flight each day for the market in which the advertisement appears ....
NAAG GUIDELINES, supra note 142, at 391 app.
191 Morales, 504 U.S. at 390.
192 Id.
193 Id. (citation omitted).
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The dissenting opinion194 criticizes the majority on various as-
pects of its decision, including its reading of both the "relate to"
clause and congressional intent. Specifically, the dissent stated
that "the Court disregards established canons of statutory con-
struction that is neither compelled by its text nor supported by
its legislative history."' 95
In his dissent, Justice Stevens stated that a fault with the ma-
jority opinion was that it focused too much on the "relate to"
clause while ignoring congressional intent available through ex-
amination of the Act's history.1 96 Further, Justice Stevens
seemed to rely heavily on congressional intent. First, he states
that preemption questions must be approached from the view
that Congress did not intend to preempt areas traditionally
within the states' regulatory powers.1 97 Next, Justice Stevens as-
serts that even if congressional intent can be found, it must be
clearly displayed. 198 Finally, the dissent points to the legislative
history of the ADA and states that it "does not reflect congres-
sional intent to exercise broad preemptive power over state
action. " 199
In concluding, the dissent flatly disagrees with the majority's
finding that the airlines would be adversely affected by compli-
ance with the NAAG Guidelines. °0 In essence, Justice Stevens
believed that the airlines did not show that the effect of compli-
ance with the Guidelines would be significant.20 1
Morales represents a significant case in the area of federal and
state regulation of airfare advertising. In taking a broad reading
of the ADA's "relate to" clause, the Court effectively brought the
area of airfare advertising under federal control. In addition,
the Court effectively prohibited the states from regulating an in-
dustry over which it has exercised considerable control in the
past. However, the next section examines another significant
Supreme Court case that may have an even greater impact than
Morales.
194 Justice Stevens authored the dissenting opinion. He was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun.
195 Maclure, supra note 90, at 912 (citing Morales, 504 U.S. at 419).
1,6 Id.
197 Morales, 504 U.S. at 419.
198 Maclure, supra note 90, at 912.
199 Id.
200 Morales, 504 U.S. at 426-27.
201 Id. at 427.
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3. Wolens v. American Airlines, Inc.
As mentioned above, the Wolens case will probably have an
even bigger impact on the regulation of airfare advertising and
airline practices than Morales. Morales may be limited by the fact
that the decision prevented the implementation of the NAAG
Guidelines. Wolens, however, deals directly with the 'airlines'
handling of the ever-popular frequent flyer miles. The decision
could impact not only the frequent flyer programs on which
many'people rely but also the advertising methods the airlines
use when advertising discount fares.
Before discussing the specifics of the cases as well as the
courts' holdings, it is necessary to discuss the background and
the origin of the frequent flyer programs. In 1981, American
Airlines began what is known today as a frequent flyer program.
Called "AAdvantage," the program today has more than 24 mil-
lion participants from all 50 states as well as numerous foreign
countries.0 In 1993, 11 million ciertificates were awarded for
frequent flyer miles. 3 With approximately 400 million passen-
gers traveling on U.S. airlines every year,20 4 the number of fre-
quent flyer certificates awarded on all of the airlines combined
is significant. The costs of the programs have hit the financially
pressed airlines especially hard. For example, on flights of 100
passengers, the airlines claim an average of six passengers fly for
free. 5 In 1988, American Airlines, which had "reserved the
right to restrict, suspend or otherwise alter aspects of the pro-
gram," reduced the program's benefits retroactively.20 6 Ameri-
can cut the number of seats available to free flyers, listed various
"blackout dates," and shut frequent, flyers out of all flights dur-
ing holidays and peak travel times. 0 7 The airlines claim they
had no choice-the frequent flyer programs turned out to be
much more popular and expensive than the airlines ever
imagined. 0 8 In essence, the airlines did not want to be in a situ-
202 Aaron Epstein & Brigid Schulte, Fight for Fliers Passengers Say Airlines
Shouldn't be Able to Reduce Benefits on Frequent Flier Miles They've Already Earned the
Supreme Court Will Decide, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 19, 1994, at A5.
203 Id.
2m1 Id.
205 Aaron Epstein & Brigid Schulte, U.S. Supreme Court to Rule on Frequent Flier
Benefit Case: At Issue is Whether Members Can Seek Damages in State Court if Awards are
Changed. The Airlines Say No, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 16, 1994, at A4.
206 Id.
207 Id.
20N Epstein & Schulte, supra note 202, at A5.
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ation where the holiday flights (traditionally the heaviest travel
period) were being filled by people using frequent flyer miles.20 9
Nevertheless, the real reason given as to why the airlines blacked
out certain dates was the financial tail-spin of Pan-American
World Airways in the late 1980s.2 11 According to Rolfe Shellen-
berger, the developer of American's frequent flyer program,
Pan Am "was approaching bankruptcy and literally filling up its
airplanes with people cashing in on free tickets... [i] t hastened
their demise-and it really caused the airlines to be a lot more
circumspect."2 1 1 As a result of the frequent flyer changes made
by American Airlines, a lawsuit was brought under Illinois law,
giving rise to the important Wolens case discussed below.
The first case discussed is the first in the series of Wolens v.
American Airlines212 cases. Following the retroactive modifica-
tions to the frequent flyer program by American Airlines in
1988, plaintiff Myron Wolens, along with three other plaintiffs,
filed a class action lawsuit 15 against American Airlines in the
Cook County Circuit Court. The complaint alleged that in 1981
or 1982, the defendant created the American Airlines AAd-
vantage frequent flyer program and solicited public member-
ship through advertisement and national mailings. The
plaintiffs alleged that this constituted a unilateral contract offer
that they accepted upon joining the program. The plaintiffs
also alleged that they accumulated both miles and credits by us-
ing the airline, and that the value of their credits was substan-
tially and adversely affected when, on May 18, 1988, the
defendant unilaterally instituted a retroactive reduction in the
benefits available in exchange for the credits. The plaintiffs al-
leged that this retroactive reduction constituted a breach of con-
tract by the defendant and further violated Illinois' Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act 14 (Consumer Fraud
Act).
The defendant removed the action to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois on grounds that
the lawsuit raised a federal question. The district court re-
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Epstein & Schulte, supra note 205, at A4.
212 565 N.E.2d 258 (1990).
213 The class action lawsuit was filed on behalf of approximately four million
AAdvantage members. Epstein & Schulte, supra note 202, at A5.
214 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 815, paras. 505/1-/12 (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995).
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manded the case to the circuit court holding that the plaintiffs'
complaint was grounded in state law.
The primary issue before the court was whether the plaintiffs'
claims were preempted by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (the
FAA Act) and the federal regulations promulgated thereun-
der.2 15 The court began its opinion with a brief discussion of
the three instances in which state law is preempted: (1) express
preemption; (2) congressional intent to preempt inferred from
the pervasiveness of the regulatory scheme; and (3) when state
law conflicts with federal law. 16 The defendant's main argu-
ment was that the plaintiffs' claims were expressly preempted.
Following the express language of the statute, the court held
that "any attempt to enjoin [the] defendant's application of its
new program rules would be an attempt to regulate the services
of an airline and thus a violation of section [41713]."217 Thus,
the plaintiffs' attempt to obtain an injunction to prevent the de-
fendant from implementing the retroactive changes was ex-
pressly preempted by federal law as an injunction directly relates
to the services of an airline.
The court, however, ultimately held that the plaintiffs' action
for damages for breach of contract and consumer fiaud was not
preempted by the FAA Act.2 18 In holding that the plaintiffs'
breach of contract action could indeed be tried under state law,
the court announced a new "tangential relation" test to deter-
mine if federal preemption applied. The court pointed out that
the plaintiffs' claim arises out of the contracts between the plain-
tiff and the defendant.219 The court further held that "[t]he
claims bear only a tangential relation to [the] defendant's rates
and services and any effect that an award of damages would have
on-[the] defendant's rates and services would be remote and
indirect."220 It is interesting to note that the court held that fed-
eral preemption did not apply because of a "tangential relation"
that was "remote and indirect," especially in light of the fact that
the preemption section of the FAA Act made no mention of the
degree that a state action had to "relate to" an airline's prices,
routes, or services.
215 Wolens, 565 N.E.2d at 261.








In addition to finding that the plaintiffs' action was not pre-
empted by federal law, the court also refused to accept the de-
fendant's other arguments. Specifically, the circuit court held
that Congress' and the Department of Transportation's exten-
sive regulation of the field of aviation did not show any intent to
occupy the entire field of aviation. 21 In addition, the defend-
ant's Commerce Clause argument (that forcing the defendant
to adhere to its frequent flyer program was an attempt by the
plaintiffs to regulate interstate commerce) was rejected.22
Following the decision by the circuit court, the defendant ap-
pealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.2 23 The issue on appeal
was the same as the issue decided by the circuit court: whether
the plaintiffs' claims were preempted by the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958.224 The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court decision while adding very little to the analysis provided by
the circuit court.
The court affirmed the lower court's finding that the plain-
tiffs' request for injunctive relief to halt the defendant's applica-
tion of its new AAdvantage rules involve an attempt to regulate
the services of the airline, a direct violation of the preemption
provision. Similar to the circuit court, however, the appellate
court allowed the claims for breach of contract and consumer
fraud to proceed. Citing precedent, the Illinois Supreme Court
held that "section [41713] preempts claims only when the un-
derlying statute or regulation itself relates to airline services, re-
gardless of whether the claim arises from a factual setting
involving airline services." 225 The court then went on to affirm
the lower court's holding that the plaintiffs' claims bear only a
tangential relation to the defendant's rates and services.2 2 6 Fi-
nally, the court rejected the defendant's implied preemption
and Commerce Clause arguments.22 7
Following the first decision of the Illinois Supreme Court,228
the defendant airline appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.2 9 Following remand from the Supreme Court, the Illi-
221 Id. at 263.
222 Id.
223 589 N.E.2d 533 (1993).
224 Id. at 535.
225 Id. (quoting West, 923 F.2d at 660).
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 See supra subpart IV.B.3 and accompanying text.
229 Wolens v. American Airlines, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 32 (1992). At the same time
the Illinois Supreme Court was deciding Wolens, the United State Supreme Court
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nois Supreme Court rendered the decision that was recently ex-
amined by the United States Supreme Court. 3 °
On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Illi-
nois Supreme Court essentially reached the same conclusion, al-
beit with two new reasons for its holding. First, the court
undertook a review of the Morales decision, with its focus on the
statement by the Supreme Court that "[s] ome state actions may
affect [airline fares] in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a
manner to have pre-emptive effect."2 3' Thus, the Illinois
Supreme Court read Morales to stand for the proposition that
some state actions and regulations, though relating to airlines'
prices, routes, or services, are permissible. Specifically, the Illi-
nois court felt that "the Morales Court intended to leave open
the possibility that certain [s] tate law actions that had only a
slight connection to an airline's rates, routes, or services, would
not be preempted by section [41713]. *3 This statement left
the door open for the Illinois Supreme Court to find against
federal preemption, and that is exactly what it did. The court,
as it had done previously, held that the plaintiffs' claims did not
relate to the rates, routes, or services of an airline and that "[a]
frequent flyer program is not an essential element to the opera-
tion of an airline."23 3
Next, the court determined that, because the plaintiffs were
only seeking monetary damages, 3 4 their claims did "not seek to
'establish the rates airlines must charge, or determine the routes
airlines must fly, or dictate the services airlines must pro-
vide.' 12' To strengthen its ruling the court discussed the con-
tractual implications of the frequent flyer programs. The court
noted that when a passenger earns miles by flying on an airline
was deciding Morales. See supra subpart IV.B.2 and accompanying text. The
Supreme Court granted the defendant's writ of certiorari, vacated judgment, and
remanded the case to the Illinois Supreme Court in light of the Morales decision.
For a discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Morales, see supra subpart
IV.B.2 and accompanying text.
230 Wolens v. American Airlines, Inc., 626 N.E.2d 205 (InI. 1993).
231 Id. at 207 (quotation and citations omitted).
232 Id. at 208.
233 Id. This statement by the court seems rather odd, especially in light of the
fact that frequent flyer programs have become an integral part of the airlines'
advertising scheme as well as an "essential" tool that many passengers count on in
choosing which airline to fly.
234 The court did not disturb the ruling that injunctive relief for the plaintiff
would be a regulation of the defendant's services, a violation of the preemption
provision.
235 Id. (citation omitted).
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or does business with an airline's affiliates, a contractual rela-
tionship is formed which vests the frequent flyer with the right
to earn specific travel awards.3 6 Because the defendant had
chosen to retroactively alter the terms of its frequent flyer pro-
gram, the court held that this constituted a breach of contract
for which the plaintiff may recover.y 7 The court went on to
hold that the finding that the plaintiffs' claims for money dam-
ages was merely a tangential relation to the defendant's rates
comports with the decision in Morales.23 8
The dissent, however, provided an interesting counterview to
the majority opinion. To begin, the dissent pointed out that the
Morales Court took an "expansive" view of the preemption provi-
sion's "relate to" clause. 39 It appears that the dissent believed
that the majority was taking too narrow a view of the "relate to"
clause, precisely the opposite view taken in the Morales dis-
sent.2 4 Further, the dissent flatly disagreed with the majority
opinion that the plaintiffs' claims bear only a tangential, tenu-
ous, or remote relation to the defendant's rates, routes, or serv-
ices. The dissent explained that because the plaintiff was
seeking a "[s] tate-court ruling that American violated the [Illi-
nois] Consumer Fraud Act through deceptive and unfair adver-
tising.. ." and "also [was seeking] a [ruling] that American has
a contractual obligation to provide . . . certain specific fares,
flights and seats. . . " then under the Morales rationale, this
would certainly have "a connection with and relation to Ameri-
can's rates and services. "241
As previously mentioned, the Illinois Supreme Court's second
ruling was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. On
November 1, 1994, the Court heard oral arguments from the
parties,242 and the decision was handed down on January 18,
1995.43
In its decision, the Court essentially bifurcated its holding
into two separate parts. The Court held that the Airline Deregu-




239 Id. at 212.
240 See supra notes 194-201 and accompanying text .for a discussion of the
Morales dissent.
241 Id.
242 Epstein & Schulte, supra note 205, at A4.
243 American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995).
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Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices
Act.244 The Court, however, held that the Act did not preempt
the plaintiffs' state law breach of contract action.245
The Court begins by undertaking an analysis of the ADA and
its preemption clause.246 The Court describes the Illinois statute
as "a means to guide and police the marketing practices of the
airlines."247 This interpretation seemingly conflicts directly with
the stated goal of the ADA, which is to allow the airlines greater
freedom within their market. Based on its interpretation of the
Illinois statute, the Court goes on to summarize its preemption
argument when it states that in light of "the full text of the pre-
emption clause, and of the ADA's purpose to leave largely to the
airlines themselves . . . the selection and design of marketing
mechanisms appropriate to the furnishing of air transportation
... [the ADA] preempts plaintiffs' claims."248
After announcing its broad preemption holding, the next step
the Court undertakes is to try to limit this holding. The Court
recognizes that the states should not have the power to overly
restrict airline competition through the use of restrictive state
laws.249 Still, the Court does "not read the ADA's preemption
clause... to shelter airlines from suits alleging no violation of
state-imposed obligations, but seeking recovery solely for the air-
line's alleged breach of its own, self-imposed undertakings." 150
This statement opens the door for the Court to allow the plain-
tiffs' contract claims. In terms of preemption issues, however,
the case does not appear to break new ground.
As previously discussed, the Court sets up its breach of con-
tract holding through the limiting language applied to its pre-
emption analysis.251 The Court focuses on the fact that the
terms and conditions offered by the airlines are essentially pri-
vate in nature; thus, the Court reasons that the terms and condi-
24 Id. at 824.
245 Id.
24 See supra note 95 and accompanying text for excerpts of the ADA preemp-
tion clause.
247 Id. at 823.
248 Id. at 823-24. The Court, however, recognized the Department of Trans-
portation's authority to investigate unfair and deceptive practices and unfair
methods of competition by airlines. Id. at 823-24 n.4. In fact, the Court seems
content to leave the job of policing the competitive practices of the airline indus-
try to the DOT, rather than to the states.
249 Id. at 824.
250 Id.
251 See supra notes 246-50 and accompanying text.
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tions of a contract do not amount to a state enactment or
enforcement of any "law, rule, regulation, standard, or other
provision having the force and effect of law within the meaning
of the [preemption clause.]" 252 Because the terms and condi-
tions of a contract do not amount to state laws or regulations
affecting airlines prices, routes, or services, the Court essentially
reasons that the preemption clause was not intended to apply to
contract disputes.
American Airlines' primary argument is that the DOT is the
exclusive monitor of the airline's undertakings. 3 Presumably,
American argues, this DOT authority also includes the authority
to monitor and resolve airline contract disputes. The Court,
however, strongly disagrees with this position, stating that
"neither the DOT nor its predecessor, the CAB, has ever con-
strued or applied this provision to displace courts as adjudica-
tors in air carrier contract disputes."254
The final, and perhaps the Court's most persuasive, argument
for allowing the plaintiffs' contract claims is based on the savings
clause. 5 The Court states that the "ADA's preemption clause
... read together with the FAA's savings clause, stops states from
imposing their own substantive standards with respect to rates,
routes, or services, but not from affording relief to a party who
claims and proves that an airline dishonored a term that the
airline itself stipulated."25 6 The Court is essentially saying that if
a plaintiff pleads a breach of contract claim against an airline,
this claim should not be preempted by the ADA. Even though it
may relate to prices, routes, or services, the contract claim is a
common law cause of action that the Court believes is separate
from the claims covered by the ADA preemption clause.
The two dissenting opinions in the Wolens 2case57 are provided
by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, with each providing diametri-
cally opposed reasons for dissenting. Justice Stevens essentially
believes that none of the plaintiffs' claims should be preempted,
252 Id. In her dissent, Justice O'Connor compares the terms and conditions of
a contract to the NAAG Guidelines the Court held were preempted in Morales.
253 Id. at 825.
254 Id.
255 See supra note 74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the savings
clause. Essentially, it allows ("saves") common law causes of action remedies in
addition to the prescribed statutory causes of action.
256 Id.
257 Both Justices concurred in part and dissented in part. For purposes of this
analysis, only the dissenting opinions are discussed.
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while Justice O'Connor believes that all of the plaintiffs' claims
should be preempted.
Justice Stevens believes that the private claims asserted by the
plaintiffs in this case should not be preempted. The key to his
dissent is that he analogizes the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act to
a codification of common law negligence rules.25 8 Because the
plaintiffs' claims are grounded in negligence, Justice Stevens be-
lieves that they should be determined using "ordinary tort prin-
ciples. '25 9  As the ADA does not preempt common law
negligence claims, the logical conclusion he reaches is that the
plaintiffs' claims in this case should not be preempted by the
ADA, because they are essentially common law negligence
claims. In addition, Justice Stevens is concerned by the "alarm-
ing enlargement" of the Morales holding.2 60 He essentially reads
the Illinois statute as prohibiting fraud; because the Morales
holding did not address preemption of general state laws
prohibiting fraud, Justice Stevens is concerned with the "major-
ity's extension of the ADA's pre-emptive reach from airline-spe-
cific advertising standards to a general background rule of
private conduct."2 61
Justice O'Connor takes an opposite approach in her dissent.
She believes that all of the plaintiffs' claims should be pre-
empted. Justice O'Connor agrees with the majority that the
plaintiffs' consumer fraud claim is preempted because it is a
state law claim relating to rates, routes, or services. It is with the
majority's contract discussion that Justice O'Connor disagrees.
She believes that Wolens is indistinguishable from Morales.262
The subject matter of both cases deals with an airline's rates and
services. Additionally, the NAAG Guidelines at issue in Morales
were not "laws"; however, the Court in that case had no trouble
finding that they were preempted.263 The key to her argument
seems to be that "where the terms of a private contract relate to
airline rates and services, and those terms can only be enforced
through state law, Morales is indistinguishable." 264 Thus, Justice
O'Connor relies on Morales to support preemption of the plain-
tiffs' claims. She believes that the plaintiffs' claims do relate to




262 Id. at 829.
263 Morales, 504 U.S. at 390-91.
264 Wolens, 115 S. Ct. at 830 (emphasis added).
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American's rates and services, and, just as the NAAG Guidelines
were not "laws," neither are the terms and conditions of the con-
tracts. Just as the NAAG Guidelines were preempted by federal
law, Justice O'Connor believes the contract claims in Wolens
should also be preempted. With respect to the majority's sav-
ings clause argument, she dismisses it by stating that "a general
'remedies' savings clause cannot be allowed to supersede the
specific substantive pre-emption provision. '261
4. Summary of Current Statutory and Case Law
Section 41713 of 49 U.S.C., also known as the preemption
provision, explicitly preempts state actions relating to "prices,
routes, or services" of an airline. Although this statement seems
innocent enough, it has provided numerous opportunities for
interpretation through litigation.
Interpretation of the statute has come primarily through two
cases. In Morales, the Supreme Court preempted the use of the
NAAG Guidelines, stating that they related to the prices, routes,
or services of an airline. In addition, the Court took a very
broad and expansive interpretation of the key "relate to" lan-
guage found in the statute. In Wolens, the Supreme Court held
that the plaintiffs' claims for consumer fraud were preempted
by the ADA preemption clause. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs'
breach of contract claims were allowed, as the Court determined
that the common law claims were not intended to be pre-
empted. The Court also relied on the savings clause to support
its holding allowing the contract claims to stand.
V. CONCLUSION
Beginning with the Morales decision, it is apparent that the
Supreme Court intends to take a broad reading of the statutory
language found in the preemption provision of the Airline De-
regulation Act of 1978. This broad reading may have further
negative implications for the states in the form of limited power
over industries such as aviation. Specifically, a state's regulatory
powers may be limited, a development that the Founding Fa-
thers may have found unnerving
The key to this area is undoubtedly the decisions in both
Wolens and Morales. As both cases demonstrate, the Supreme
Court has taken a very broad reading of the preemption clause.
265 Id. at 832 (citing Morales, 504 U.S. at 385).
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It is clear that the Court will not hesitate to hold that a plain-
tiff's claim is preempted if it is based on state law that relates to
prices, routes, or services of an airline. The Court's preemption
holding in Wolens should prevent expansive and highly restric-
tive state regulation. Thus, in the future it is unlikely the air-
lines will be subject "to all kinds of regulation by state
governments that airlines are currently not subject to."266 Con-
sequently, Congress' goal of deregulation is achieved while
preventing fifty different state regulations governing the same
program.267
As Wolens showed, however, the Court will not preempt all
plaintiff claims' against an airline. The Court will allow a plain-
tiff's breach of contract claim against an airline to stand, regard-
less of whether the claim directly affects the prices, routes, or
services of the airline. The obvious conclusion to draw from this
is that plaintiffs should try to structure a claim against an airline
in breach of contract terms.
The Court's preemption rulings could have an ominous effect
on the states. The Court may use its broad reading of the ADA
preemption provision as a model for interpreting other preemp-
tion provisions in other acts. Language such as that found in
ERISA and the ADA will give the federal government power to
regulate industries, such as aviation, that operate entirely within
the states. If that is the case, states may see their regulatory pow-
ers diminished.
Regardless of the Court's holdings, it is clear that airline de-
regulation will continue. As a result, the "airfare wars" that al-
low many passengers to buy highly discounted tickets are likely
to continue. Along with deregulation comes competition, and it
seems likely that competition for passengers among the airlines
will be fierce, resulting in lower overall fares for consumers.
Although lower fares seem like good news, along with those
fares comes the advertising by the airlines, and possibly more
changes in frequent flyer programs. The ultimate losers may
turn out to be consumers as they may continue to be fooled by
allegedly deceptive airline advertising, and may be faced with
more restrictive frequent flyer programs, upon which many con-
sumers depend.
266 Epstein & Schulte, supra note 205, at A4.
267 Id.
242
